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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This certification arises out of Appellant, Ohio Casualty Insurance Company's 
("Ohio") appeal of the federal district court's order, granting Unigard Insurance Company's 
("Unigard") motion for partial summary judgment, issued on November 14, 2006. Ohio 
appeals only that portion of the federal district court's order, requiring that defense costs in 
defending an underlying action, Edizone, LC v. Cloud Nine, LLC, et aL, Civil No. 
1:04CV00117 TS ("Edizone Action"), be split equally between Unigard and Ohio, based 
upon the "other insurance" clauses in the successive policies. (Attachments, pp. 1-17; Aplt. 
App. v. 13, pp. 2062 - 2078). The federal district court's order with respect to all other 
issues was not appealed by Ohio. 
This case originally concerned a request for declaratory judgment to determine the 
rights and obligations, if any, of West American Insurance Company ! ("West American"), 
Ohio and Unigard to provide defense and indemnity to Cloud Nine, LLC, and its principals 
("Cloud Nine") in the Edizone Action, a civil suit brought by a product and technology 
developer, Edizone, L.C. ("Edizone"), which licensed patents and other intellectual property 
to the Cloud Nine for manufacture and sale of a elastomer gel technology and product known 
as "Gelastic" and "GellyComb". (Aplt. App. v. 1-2, pp. 16 - 438). 
1
 Unigard has admitted and agreed that none of the allegations in the Edizone Action alleged a 
covered advertising injury against Cloud Nine that could have occurred during the effective 
periods of the insurance policies issued by West American (June, 1998, through June, 2001), and 
therefore, no claim is made that West American owes a duty to defend or indemnify Cloud Nine 
and the entirety of the Appellant's brief will deal only with Ohio's duty under its insurance 
contract. 
1 
Ohio insured Cloud Nine for a one-year period from 6/10/2001 to 6/10/2002. (Aplt. 
App. v. 1, p. 19, K 12). Cloud Nine had no insurance from 6/10/2002 to 12/12/2002. (Aplt. 
App. v. 6, p. 1091). Unigard thereafter insured Cloud Nine for the three-year period from 
12/12/2002 to 12/12/2005. (Aplt. App. v. 3, p. 565,12). 
On May 22,2006, Unigard filed its motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that 
both Ohio and Unigard had a duty to defend Cloud Nine in the Edizone Action and that all 
defense costs incurred in defending the Cloud Nine should be split equally (50/50) between 
Unigard and Ohio.2 (Aplt. App. v. 4, pp. 623 - 658). Unigard based its argument upon the 
"other insurance" clause terms contained within the subject successive, non-concurrent 
policies issued by Ohio and Unigard. (Aplt. App. v. 3 pp. 654 - 656). Ohio opposed 
Unigard's motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that Unigard's reliance upon the 
"other insurance" clauses contained within the Ohio and Unigard policies was not supported 
by the plain language of the "other insurance" clauses themselves, case law interpreting such 
clauses, insurance law treatises, or the required "time on the risk" method of apportionment 
of defense costs required by this Court's decision in Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. and Surety 
Co., 931 P.2d 127, 141-142(1997). (Aplt. App. v. 6, pp. 1089-1091). 
On September 21,2006, the district court heard oral argument, Judge Tena Campbell 
presiding. (Aplt. App. v. 13, pp. 2155-2174). On November 14,2006, the federal district 
2
 On June 20, 2006, Cloud Nine filed its joinder to Unigard's motion for partial summary 
judgment, however, it only joined in Unigard's coverage arguments and did not join in Unigard's 
or any other arguments related to allocation of defense costs. (Aplt. App. v. 5, pp. 1037-1040. 
Thus, Cloud Nine has waived any argument on this issue. 
2 
court issued its ruling, granting Unigard's motion for partial summaryjudgment and ordering 
all defense costs and fees in the Edizone Action be shared equally between Ohio and Unigard 
without regard to each insurers' time on the risk. (Attachments, pp. 1-17; Aplt. App. v. 13, 
pp. 2062 - 2078). As a basis for its ruling, the federal district court relied on the "other 
insurance" clause terms contained within the non-concurrent, successive policies issued by 
Ohio and Unigard. (Attachments, pp. 15 - 17; Aplt. App. v. 13, pp. 2076 - 2078). 
On November 28, 2006, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), Ohio filed a motion to 
reconsider the courts order allocating defense costs. (Aplt. App. v. 13, pp. 2079 - 2110). 
The district court denied Ohio's motion to reconsider on January 24, 2007. (Attachments, 
pp. 18-20; Aplt. App. v. 13, pp. 2132 - 2134). 
On November 27,2007, the federal district court's order, granting Unigard's motion 
for partial summaryjudgment and allocating defense costs became a final and appealable 
order when all remaining claims not decided by said order were dismissed, with prejudice, 
as Ohio and Unigard settled all claims asserted against Cloud Nine in the Edizone Action. 
(Attachments, pp. 21 -23; Aplt. App. v. 13, pp. 2144-2146). Thereafter, Ohio timely filed 
its Notice of Appeal on December 27, 2007. (Aplt. App. v. 13, pp. 2147 - 2150). 
Ohio and Unigard fully briefed the issues on appeal and submitted them to the Tenth 
Circuit. 
Oral argument was held on the case before the Tenth Circuit on January 14, 2009. 
Barbara K. Berrett argued for Ohio and Rebecca L. Hill argued for Unigard and the case was 
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submitted to Judges Henry, Brisco and Lucero. Subsequently on April 28, 2009, Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeal Judges Henry, Brisco and Lucero certified a question of state law 
to the Utah Supreme Court. 
The Utah Supreme Court, by order accepted the question certified to it on June 18, 
2009. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On July 6,2005, Ohio filed its Complaint for Declaratory Judgment to determine the 
rights and obligations, if any, of West American, Ohio and Unigard in providing defense and 
indemnification for Cloud Nine in the Edizone Action. (Aplt. App. v. 1-2, pp. 16 - 438). 
The Edizone Action was a civil suit brought by a product and technology developer, 
Edizone, which licensed patents and other intellectual property to the Cloud Nine for 
manufacture and sale of an elastomer gel technology and product known as "Gelastic" and 
"GellyComb". (Aplt. App. v. 1, pp. 54 - 103). From April 7, 1998 until March 11, 2002, 
Cloud Nine had a license agreement with Edizone, whereby they could use Edizone's 
trademarks and intellectual property. Id. However, on March 11,2002, Edizone terminated 
Cloud Nine's license for failure to pay Edizone and other issues. (Aplt. App. v. 1, p. 61, <[ 
47). 
Notwithstanding the earlier license termination on March 11,2002, Edizone alleged 
that Cloud Nine continued to make, sell, and/or alter the elements of GellyComb products 
in violation of its intellectual property rights. (Aplt. App v. 1, pp. 62 - 63). As a result of 
4 
Cloud Nine's alleged infringement of Edizone's patents, trademarks, and tradenames while 
marketing, advertising, and selling Cloud Nine's products, Edizone filed suit on August 26, 
2004. (Aplt. App. v. 1, pp. 54 - 103). 
During the period of time that the alleged infringing acts occurred, Cloud Nine was 
insured by separate, non-concurrent insurance policies issued by Ohio3 and Unigard.4 Ohio 
provided insurance coverage to Cloud Nine for one year - June 10, 2001 to June 10, 2002. 
(Aplt. App. v. 2, p. 323). Unigard provided insurance coverage for a three-year period from 
December 12, 2002 to December 12, 2005. (Aplt. App. v. 4, pp. 632, 665; v. 5, pp. 820 -
984). During the six-month gap between the expiration of the Ohio policy on June 10,2002, 
and the inception of the Unigard policy on December 12,2002, Cloud Nine was uninsured. 
There is nothing in the record as to why Cloud Nine was uninsured for this six month gap. 
As noted above, for the nine months of Ohio's policy from June 10,2001 until March 
11, 2002, Cloud Nine had a license agreement with Edizone, whereby they could use 
Edizone's trademarks and intellectual property, thus, Edizone could not and did not assert 
claims for any advertising injury during that period. Accordingly, Ohio only had three 
months on the risk, dating from the termination of the license agreement to the end of its 
policy period, i.e.; March 11. 2002 through June 10. 2002. during which an alleged 
3
 Ohio Casualty Insurance Policy No. BKO (02) 52343482 effective June 10, 2001 to June 10, 
2002. (Aplt. App. v. 1, p. 19, v. 2, pp. 322-437). 
4
 Unigard Insurance Company Policy No. CM007917 (Aplt. App. v. 4, pp. 632, 655, v. 5, pp. 
820-984). Unigard issued three consecutive policies effective December 12, 2002 to December 
12, 2005. (Aplt. App. v. 3, pp. 565-570, v. 4, p. 665). 
5 
advertising injury offense could have occurred. (Aplt. App. v. 2, pp. 323, 337)(emphasis 
added). 
The Ohio policy provided liability insurance coverage for personal and advertising 
injury from June 10,2001 to June 10,2002. (Aplt. App. v 2, p. 337). Specifically, Coverage 
B of the Ohio policy "Insuring Agreement," in pertinent part, provides: 
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of "personal and 
advertising injury" to which this insurance applies. We will 
have the right and duty to defend the insured against any "suit" 
seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to 
defend the insured against any "suit" seeking damages for 
"personal and advertising injury" to which this insurance does 
not apply. We may, at our discretion, investigate any offense 
and settle any claim or "suit" that may result. 
b. This insurance applies to: 
..."personal and advertising injury" caused by an offense 
arising out of your business but only if the offense was 
committed in the "coverage territory" during the policy period. 
(Aplt. App. v. 2, p. 337)(emphasis added). 
The Ohio policy further contained an "other insurance" clause, that provides for equal 
sharing of defense costs for a covered loss, if and only if other valid and collectible 
insurance is available to the insured for a loss covered by the Ohio policy. (Aplt. App. v. 2, 
pp. 342 - 343)(emphasis added). Specifically, the policy stated in relevant part: 
Other Insurance 
If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the insured 
6 
for a loss we cover under Coverages A or B of this Coverage 
Part, our obligations are limited as follows: 
a. Primary Insurance 
This insurance is primary except when b. below 
applies. If this insurance is primary, our 
obligations are not affected unless any of the 
other insurance is also primary. Then, we will 
share with all that other insurance by the method 
described in c. below. 
c. Method of Sharing 
If all of the other insurance permits contribution 
by equal shares, we will follow this method also. 
Under this approach each insurer contributes 
equal amounts until it has paid its applicable limit 
of insurance or none of the loss remains, 
whichever comes first. 
If any other insurance does not permit 
contribution by equal shares, we will contribute 
by limits. Under this method, each insurer's share 
is based on the ratio of its applicable limit of 
insurance to the total applicable limits of 
insurance of all insurers. 
(Aplt. App. v. 2, pp. 342-343)(emphasis added). 
Unigard's subsequent policies beginning on December 12, 2002, also provided for 
personal and advertising injury liability coverage and its insuring provision and its "other 
insurance" clauses were identical to those under Ohio's policy. (Aplt. App. v.4, p. 632; v. 5. 
pp. 924 - 925). Additionally, Unigard's three policies issued to Cloud Nine provided 
$1,000,000.00 policy limits per year for three years. (Aplt. App. v. 3, pp. 565; v. 5, p. 906). 
7 
The Ohio one-year policy also had a $1,000,000.00 policy limit. (Aplt. App. v. 2, p. 324). 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Ohio and Unigard policies were successive and not 
concurrent, Unigard filed a motion for partial summary judgment on May 22,2006, arguing 
among other issues that as a matter of law all defense costs incurred in defending Cloud Nine 
should be split equally (50/50) between Unigard and Ohio. (Aplt. App. v. 4, pp. 654 - 656). 
Unigard's argument was based upon the policies "other insurance" clauses that provided for 
an equal distribution of defense costs when other valid and collectible insurance is available 
to the insured for a loss covered by the policy. (Aplt. App. v. 4, pp. 655 - 656). 
On August 21, 2006, Ohio responded to Unigard's motion for summary judgment 
arguing, in part, that the "other insurance" clause only applies to concurrent coverage of 
another insurer for losses that occurred during the June 10, 2001 to June 10, 2002 policy 
period. (Aplt. App. v. 6, pp. 1089 - 1091). Ohio further argued because the "other 
insurance" clause was inapplicable to successive insurance policies, the "time on the risk" 
defense cost allocation method mandated by the Utah Supreme Court in Sharon Steel v. 
Corp. v. Aetna Cas. And Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127 (1997) controls. 
Nevertheless, the federal district court accepted Unigard's arguments and relying upon 
the "other insurance" clauses contained in Ohio and Unigard policies, held that all defense 
costs and fees in the Edizone Action be shared equally between Ohio and Unigard without 
regard to each insurers' time on the risk. (Attachments, pp. 15 - 17; Aplt. App. v. 13, pp. 
8 
2076-2078).5 
The federal district court's order was appealed, fully briefed and oral argument was 
held on January 14, 2009, before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has certified a legal question to this Court, asking 
whether under Utah law, the defense costs incurred by Ohio and Unigard in defending the 
insured in the underlying Edizone Action should be allocated between Ohio [Appellant] and 
Unigard [Appellee] under the "equal shares" method set forth in the "other insurance" 
clauses of Ohio's and Unigard's policies or according to the "time on the risk" method 
prescribed in this Court's opinion in Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. and Surety Co., 931 
P.2d. 127, 140 (Utah 1997). 
It is Ohio's position that the federal district court incorrectly relied upon the "other 
insurance" clauses contained in Ohio's and Unigard's policies to allocate the defense costs 
because the "other insurance" clauses are only applicable when there is concurrent coverage 
for the same loss actually covered by two or more insurance policies. Here, Ohio's and 
Unigard's insurance policies are successive and not concurrent, which Unigard's counsel 
5
 The total defense costs incurred in defending Cloud Nine in the Edizone Action were 
$2,698,950.77. As a result of the federal district court decision, Ohio has paid $1,304,558.10 in 
defense costs (in addition to settlement monies) although there were only three months during 
which Cloud Nine could have caused an advertizing offense during Ohio's policy because Cloud 
Nine had a licence agreement to advertise the goods until March 12, 2002. 
9 
conceded during oral argument at the Tenth Circuit. Clearly then, the equal apportionment 
language in the "other insurance" clauses are not controlling, when determining the proper 
method of apportionment of defense costs in this case. 
The federal district court below, in reaching its conclusion in this matter, relied upon 
Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 140 P.3d 210 (Utah 2006). However, the Benjamin case 
clearly does not address the issue of how insurance carriers should equitably allocate defense 
costs between successive insurance providers. Instead, Benjamin simply addresses the duty 
to defend when there are covered and non-covered claims asserted in the same lawsuit and 
one policy applies. See Benjamin 140 P.3d at 1216. Indeed, the Benjamin case did not 
involve a continuing injury claim spanning successive policies and policy years. In a 
continuing injury case such as the instant case, successive policies insure the same type of 
risk, but not the same risk, because to hold that successive policies cover the same risk would 
render an insurer liable for damage occurring outside its policy period. Ohio's policy covers 
personal injury and advertizing injury losses "only if the offense was committed...during its 
policy period." 
To avoid the time on the risk method of apportioning defense costs set forth in Sharon 
Steel, Unigard claims that the "other insurance" clauses, although not applicable here, 
constitute express policy language which decrees the method of apportionment. See Sharon 
Steel, 931 P.2d at 140. However, this is not the case. Again, at oral argument at the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, Unigard's counsel conceded that the policies at issue in the Sharon 
10 
Steel case more than likely all had "other insurance" clauses in the policies, because "other 
insurance" clauses have been standard in CGL policies since approximately the 1950s. The 
"other insurance" clauses by their own language simply do not apply here as evidence of any 
such intent because the policies are successive and not concurrent. 
A similar analysis was recently made by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
in Boston Gas Co, v. Century Indemnity Co., 454 Mass 337, 910 N.E.2d 290 (Mass. 2009) 
("the Boston case"). That case, as here, involved the First Circuit Court of Appeals, 
certifying questions of state law regarding the allocation of damages amongst the insured, 
when self insured, and insurance carriers when there were successive policies in a 
"progressive injury"case. The Boston Court specifically looked at the "other insurance" 
clauses in standard CGL policies and found that those clauses do not reflect an intention to 
cover losses for damages outside the policy period and do not apply to successive coverage 
situations. Id. at 308-09. 
In this particular continuing injury case, as in Sharon Steel, and the Boston case, the 
only fair and equitable way of dividing the approximately two million dollars plus in defense 
costs among the parties here, is to use the "time on the risk" allocation adopted by this Court 
some years ago. Ohio therefore respectfully requests that this Court find that the other 
insurance clauses are not applicable here by the policies' own terms and that the defense 
costs should be divided amongst Ohio, Unigard and the insured by the time on the risk 
allocation method adopted by this Court in Sharon Steel 
11 
ARGUMENT 
I. OHIO'S AND UNIGARD'S "OTHER INSURANCE" CLAUSES DO 
NOT APPLY OR GOVERN THE ALLOCATION OF DEFENSE 
COSTS IN THIS CASE. 
Again, the "other insurance" clause contained in Ohio's policy provides for equal 
sharing of defense costs for a covered loss, // and only if, other valid and collectible 
insurance is available to the insured for a loss covered by the Ohio policy. (Aplt. App. v. 2, 
pp. 342 - 343)(emphasis added). Indeed, the specific policy language, "a loss we cover," 
found in Ohio's "other insurance" clause plainly and expressly limits its application to only 
those circumstances where there exists concurrent coverage by another insurer for the same 
loss covered by Ohio. 
In its brief, Unigard erroneously argues that a covered personal and advertising injury 
loss under Ohio's policy can span beyond its policy term and trigger successive policy 
periods. (Appellee's Brief, p. 13)(emphasis added). However, Ohio's policy expressly limits 
covered losses to only those that arise during its policy period.(Aplt. App. v. 2, p. 337). 
Specifically, Ohio's insuring agreement provides that a "personal and advertising 
injury [is covered]. . . only if the offense was committed . . . during the policy period." 
(Aplt. App. v. 2, p. 337)(emphasis added). Therefore, to be a covered "personal and 
advertising injury" loss it must have occurred during the policy period from June 10, 2001 
to June 10, 2002. (Aplt. App. v. 1, p. 19, v. 2, pp. 322 - 437). A loss that occurs after June 
10,2002, is defacto not a covered loss because it occurs beyond the coverage period. Sharon 
12 
Steel Corporation v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, et aL, 931 P.2d 127, 141 (Utah 
1997). 
Indeed, in order to give effect to Ohio's "other insurance" clause, Unigard's policies 
must qualify as "other valid and collectible insurance available to the insured" that covers 
the same covered loss under Ohio's policy. (Aplt. App. v. 2, pp. 342 - 343)(emphases 
added). As previously discussed above, in order to cover the same covered loss under Ohio's 
policy, Unigard's policy must provide coverage during Ohio's policy period, i.e. June 10, 
2001 to June 10, 2002. (Aplt. App. v. 1, p. 19, v. 2, pp. 322 - 437). They simply do not. 
Unigard's subsequent policies began on December 12, 2002, six months after the 
expiration of Ohio's policy term on June 10, 2002. (Aplt. App. v. 4, p. 632; v. 5, pp. 917, 
924-925). Accordingly, Unigard's policies do not cover the same loss covered by Ohio's 
policy because the policies span different coverage periods. Taco Bell Corp. v. Continental 
Casualty Co., 388 F.3d 1069, 1078 (7th Cir. 2004)(stating that successive policies merely 
insure the same kind of risk but not the same risk.). 
Nevertheless, in an effort to side-step the requirement of concurrent coverage under 
Ohio's "other insurance" clause, Unigard argues that it insured the same "kind" of loss at 
issue in this matter, i.e. "advertising injury," therefore it qualifies as "other valid and 
collectible insurance" available to the insured.(Appellee's Brief, pp. 13 -14). However, 
unremarked by Unigard in its brief, is the fact that Unigard exclusively covers personal and 
advertising losses "[o]nly if the offense was committed . . . during [its] policy period." 
13 
(Aplt. App. v. 4, p. 632; v. 5, pp. 917, 924-925). Thus, based upon Unigard's own policy 
language it could not and did not insure losses covered by Ohio because Unigard's policy 
does not cover losses outside its policy period that began six months after the expiration of 
Ohio's policy period. 
Because Ohio's policy and Unigard's policies do not have any overlapping coverage 
periods, there is no other valid and collectible insurance available to a loss covered by Ohio's 
policy. Thus, Ohio's "other insurance" clause's alternative methods of apportionment are 
inapplicable and the district court's reliance upon it is error and this Court should answer the 
Tenth Circuit's certified question by finding that the "other insurance" clauses do not control 
the allocation of defense costs. 
A. THE "OTHER INSURANCE" CLAUSES IN THE POLICIES 
AT ISSUE DO NOT CONSTITUTE "EXPRESS POLICY 
LANGUAGE" DECREEING A METHOD OF 
APPORTIONMENT AS THEY ARE EXPRESSLY LIMITED 
TO APPLICATION IN CONCURRENT OR OVERLAPPING 
COVERAGE. 
Unigard argues that the "other insurance" clauses in the successive policies constitute 
the "express policy language that decrees a different method of apportionment" referred to 
in the Sharon Steel case that would obviate the need to apply the "time on the risk" 
allocation. It cites to Footnote 18 of the Sharon Steel case where the Sharon Court 
explained that the parties in the case did not provide a thorough briefing on the 
apportionment issue and thus, Unigard implies that had the parties in Sharon Steel cited the 
Court to the "other insurance" clauses, the Court would have reached a different conclusion. 
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See Sharon Steel, 931 P.2d at 140, fn. 18. Conversely, Unigard has also implied that the 
Sharon Steel policies may not have included "other insurance" clauses. 
As conceded by Unigard's counsel at oral argument at the Tenth Circuit, the policies 
at issue in the Sharon Steel case more than likely all had "other insurance" clauses as most 
insurance policies have contained such clauses since approximately 1952. See e.g., Oregon 
Auto Ins. Co., v. USF&G, Co., 195 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1952). Again, a more sound inference 
is that the "other insurance" clauses were not discussed by counsel or the Court in Sharon 
Steel because in keeping with the majority of case law, authoritative texts and scholars on the 
subject, such "other insurance" clauses do not apply in situations with continuing injuries 
over successive policies, which were at issue in Sharon Steel and are at issue in the case here. 
Indeed, it is important to note that Cloud Nine's own defense counsel in this case, did not 
even join in Unigard's motion for partial summary judgment on this issue at all, and has 
waived any argument that the "other insurance" clauses apply. 
B. A LOSS COVERED BY OHIO'S POLICY CANNOT SPAN 
BEYOND IT'S EXPRESS POLICY PERIOD AND IT HAS 
NOT CONTRACTED TO PAY DEFENSE COSTS FOR 
OCCURRENCES OR OFFENSES WHICH TAKE PLACE 
OUTSIDE OF THAT POLICY. 
Unigard now argues that the term "loss we cover" as used in the "other insurance" 
clauses are broad and have no temporal limitations. That construction is directly contrary to 
this Court's decision and the plain language of the Ohio and Unigard policies. Ohio's policy 
specifically states that "this insurance applies to 'personal and advertising injury' caused by 
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an offense arising out of your business, but only if the offense was committed...during the 
policy period." See Aplt. App. v. 1, p. 337 (emphasis added). Thus, any advertising injury 
offense covered under Ohio's policy must have occurred during Ohio's express policy 
period. As noted, although the term "loss" used by itself may be interpreted broadly, its 
application must be limited by the express terms that surround it. Here, the term "loss" is 
followed by the terms "we cover." Thus, the "other insurance" clauses alteranative method 
of apportionment are limited to circumstances where there is other insurance available for 
loss actually covered by the Ohio policy. Again, while a "loss" may span successive policy 
periods, in order to be covered under the Ohio policy, it must fall within Ohio's policy period 
to be a covered loss. (Aplt. App. v. 2, p. 337 (emphasis added). Moreover, this Court 
specifically in the Sharon Steel case noted that "[ijnsurers have not contracted to pay defense 
costs for occurrences which took place outside the policy period." See Sharon Steel Corp. 
v. Aetna Cas. & Surety, Co., 931 P.2d 127,141 (Utah 1997) (emphasis added). Accordingly, 
the foregoing demonstrates that clearly the plain language of the Ohio and Unigard policies 
shows that there is temporal restrictive language that applies to the "other insurance" clauses 
and the other insurance clauses do not apply in this case. 
C. ALL SCHOLARLY TEXTS AND THE MAJORITY OF 
CASES HAVE FOUND THAT "OTHER INSURANCE" 
CLAUSES ONLY APPLY TO CONCURRENT / 
OVERLAPPING INSURANCE. 
The Ohio and Unigard policies do not insure the same risk just the same kind of risk 
because the polices are successive, thus, the "other insurance" clauses do not apply here. 
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This distinction as set forth in our original brief has been recognized by the majority of 
courts, authoritative texts and scholars, who have examined this precise issue. 
As discussed in the original brief, in Taco Bell Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 338 
F.3d 1067 (7th Cir. 2004), the Seventh Circuit held that the trial court's reliance on the "other 
insurance" clauses was improper because such clauses are not applicable in cases where "two 
policies, each with an 'other insurance' clause, insure merely the same kind of risk, but not 
the same risk, because the policies are successive."6 Id, at 1079 (emphasis added). See also 
Douglas R. Richmond, "Issues and Problems in 'Other Insurance,' Multiple Insurance and 
Self-Insurance," 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1373,1376 - 77 (1995); If 7:1, Allan D. Windt, Insurance 
Claims and Disputes (4th ed.) at 895 (2001). See also, Securalns. Co. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 
497 N.W.2d 230, 232 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); Alberici v. Safeguard Mutual Ins. Co., 664 
A.2d 110, 114 (Pa. 1995); NL Indus, v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 935 F.Supp. 513, 518 
(D.N.J. 1996). 
Indeed, as previously mentioned in the original brief, in a new case Boston Gas Co. 
v. Sentry Indemnity Co., 454 Mass. 337,910 N.E.2d 290 (Mass. 2009), the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts specifically looked at the applicability of "other insurance" clauses 
to property damage which occurred over successive years and noted that the insurers had not 
contracted to provide coverage for losses occurring outside their policy period, they had 
6
 Although, the Taco Bell Court did ultimately affirm the trial court's equal allocation of defense 
costs, its ruling was not based on the "other insurance" clauses, rather it was based on Illinois law 
and the fact that neither party suggested any better method of dividing the costs. Id at 1079. 
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merely contracted to provide coverage for liability attributable to damages or here, offenses, 
occurring during the given policy. Ld. at 307. The Boston Court stated: 
Footnote 36, which accompanies the above referenced quote states exactly what Ohio 
has been saying here as follows: 
FN36. " 'Other insurance5 refers only to two or more concurrent policies, 
which insure the same risk and the same interest, for the benefit of the same 
person, during the same period. However, 'other insurance' clauses are not 
intended to allocate liability among successive insurers because they do not 
insure the same risk and would unjustly make consecutive insurers liable for 
damages occurring outside their policy periods." 23 E.M. Holmes, Appleman 
on Insurance § 145.4[C], at 34 (2d ed. 2003). 
"Historically, 'other insurance' clauses were designed to prevent multiple 
recoveries when more than one policy provided coverage for a given loss.... 
An example of a typical multiple-coverage case is the situation in which a loss 
is incurred by an insured driver while driving an automobile of an insured 
owner with the owner's permission.... In such a case both policies clearly cover 
the entire loss." (Citations omitted.) Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 
138 N.J. 437, 470, 650 A.2d 974 (1994). 
Id. at 309 fn.36. 
The Boston Court finally notes that in the policies at issue in that case, there was no 
so called "non-cumulation" clause which would provide continuing coverage beyond the 
policy period. Id. Again, there is no "non-cumulation" clause in the Ohio policy either. The 
Boston Court concluded that the policies there do not provide coverage for damages that 
occur outside the policy period, and thus the other insurance clauses do not apply. 
The Boston Court's, as well as the other scholars and cases cited, conclusion that 
"other insurance" clauses do not apply to allocate defense costs in successive policies as 
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there is a temporal aspect, are supported by the plain language of this Court in Sharon Steel 
Again, the Court in Sharon Steel found that insurers do not contract under general liability 
policies, such as the one at issue here, to pay defense costs for occurrences which took place 
outside the policy period. See Sharon Steel, 931 P.2d 127, 141 (Utah 1997). 
Accordingly, Ohio requests that this Court answer the Tenth Circuit's certified 
question by declaring that the defense costs should be allocated by time on the risk formula 
set forth in Sharon Steel and find that Ohio is only obligated to pay its share of defense costs 
in relation to the three months that it was on the risk when the insured could have caused the 
advertising injury. 
II. THE TIME ON THE RISK ALLOCATION OF DEFENSE COSTS IN 
THIS CASE IS THE MOST EQUITABLE METHOD WHICH IS IN 
KEEPING WITH UTAH'S CASE LAW AND UTAH'S PUBLIC 
POLICY OBJECTIVES. 
Unigard argues that Utah law regarding an insurers duty to defend justifies 
apportioning defense costs by equal shares between Ohio Casualty and Unigard, even though 
the "other insurance" clauses do not apply. For this proposition, Unigard cited th<Benjamin 
v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 140 P.3d 1210 (Utah 2006), a case relied upon also by the federal 
district court judge. The Benjamin decision however is not relevant to the issue presented 
here. The case mBenjamin did not involve similar circumstances to the situation presented 
here. Indeed, in Benjamin, this Court addressed an insurers duty to defend on covered and 
non-covered claims asserted in the same action. Utah law, as earlier noted, clearly 
distinguishes an insurers duty to defend under a policy as separate and distinct from the 
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allocation of incurred defense costs among successive insurance as was reviewed in Sharon 
Steel The Sharon Steel Court expressly stated that the mere recognition that an insurer has 
a duty to defend does not resolve the issue of how, absent express contractual language, a 
trial court should equitably apportion those defense costs. IdL at 140. Again, a co-insurer's 
equal obligation to defend provides an insurer the right for contribution from a co-insurer to 
pay its share of defense expenses as noted by the Sharon Court. Id at 138. The Benjamin 
decision did not consider the issue of an insurer's appropriate share of defense expenses. 
This Court, when it addressed this issue earlier in the Sharon Steel case noted that 
Utah courts should apply an equitable approach that "better reflects what each insurer 
contracted to provide," taking into consideration the time that each insurer was on the risk 
and the respective policy limits. Id at 140. Again, determining an insurer's share based upon 
its respective time on the risk does not relieve an insurer of an obligation to defend all claims 
in a suit. As noted by other courts, thpro rata mechanism of apportionment among insurers 
does not affect the contractual relationship between the insurer and the insured, that requires 
an insurer to provide a full defense to all claims. However, as noted by the Sharon Steel 
Court, an insurer does not contract to pay defense costs for occurrences which take place 
outside its policy period. Id. at 141. 
Moreover, the time on the risk formula allocation which requires an insured bear part 
of the defense costs for the period it was uninsured, self insured or otherwise without 
coverage is only fair and equitable. There is no evidence in the record as to why Cloud Nine 
20 
did not have insurance for six months but it is important to note that the insured Cloud Nine 
defendants did not join in Unigard's motion for partial summary judgment on this issue and 
waived any argument with respect to allocating Cloud Nine a portion of the defense costs for 
the time it was uninsured. This reflects the insured's conscious decision to assume or retain 
a risk for a particular period of time. 
In this case, the facts are that Ohio insured the Cloud Nine defendants when it had a 
valid licensing agreement for all but three months of the one year policy period. The Cloud 
Nine defendants then went without insurance for six months for whatever reason, absorbing 
the risk of loss during those six months. Thereafter, Unigard determined through 
underwriting and we assume investigation, that Unigard would insure the Cloud Nine 
defendants for three years, despite the fact that the Cloud Nine defendants had no licensing 
agreement or patent for the goods it was manufacturing. To divide the sizeable defense costs 
incurred to date on the formula set forth below,7 based upon the pro rata allocation set forth 
in Sharon Steel, forwards certain public policy considerations that are important. It promotes 
7
 In the instant case, Ohio policy's period began on June 10, 2001 and was effective until June 
10, 2002. From June 10, 2001 until March 11, 2002, the insured had a license agreement with 
Edizone, whereby it could use Edizone's trademarks and intellectual property, thus, there could 
have been no advertising injury during that period. Accordingly, Ohio only had three months on 
the risk, i.e.; March 11, 2002 through June 10, 2002, for which it may have been exposed for any 
sort of coverage liability in this case. In contrast, it appears that the Cloud Nine Defendants had 
six months of uninsured time between the expiration of the June 10, 2002, Ohio policy and the 
inception of the Unigard's first policy on December 12, 2002. Accordingly, the Cloud Nine 
Defendants would be liable for a six month time frame. Unigard has the vast majority of time on 
the risk with three consecutive policy periods from December 12, 2002 to December 12, 2005, 
for a total of three years, or 36 months. Both Unigard and Ohio had the same policy limits. 
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judicial efficiency, engenders stability and predictability in the insurance markets and 
provides incentive for responsible commercial behavior by both insureds and insurers. 
Clearly, allocating the defense costs based upon pro rata method will produce the only 
equitable results here. Further, it will support the contractual undertakings of all the parties. 
See Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indemnity Co., 454 Mass 337,910 N.E.2d 290 (Mass. 2009). 
The foregoing clearly demonstrates that the "other insurance" clauses do not apply in 
this situation and that the allocation of the defense costs based on time on the risk as set forth 
in Sharon Steel is the only method which is consistent with the policy language, equity and 
important public policy objectives. Accordingly Ohio requests that this Court answer the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' certified question by ordering that defense costs incurred in 
defending the insured be apportioned as between Ohio, Cloud Nine and Unigard, based on 
the time of the risk method prescribed in Sharon Steel. 
CONCLUSION 
Ohio requests that the Utah Supreme Court answer the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals' certified question by declaring that the "other insurance" clauses are not applicable 
in this case as there are no concurrent insurance policies at issue; that Sharon Steel's time on 
the risk method of allocation applies; and that Ohio is only liable for the defense costs 
incurred during its time on the risk. The foregoing ruling would be consistent with the terms 
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of the policies, this Court's decision in Sharon Steel, equity and important public policy 
objectives. 
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